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Zoning Out Discrimination: Working Towards Housing Equality in 
Ontario 
  
JESSICA SIMONE ROHER

 
 
En Ontario, c’est le gouvernement local qui doit assurer l’accessibilité du logement et 
l’élimination des barrières au logement. Cet article examine comment le Code des droits 
de la personne de l’Ontario peut être utilisé pour contester les règlements municipaux de 
zonage qui règlementent l’utilisation du terrain autorisée. Nous le faisons notamment en 
démontrant que certains règlements portent atteinte aux droits des personnes en vertu du 
Code, en limitant les endroits où ces personnes peuvent vivre. Bien que les plaideurs de 
l’Ontario aient relativement bien réussi à utiliser le Code pour lutter, directement et 
indirectement, contre la discrimination en matière de logement, le cas des règlements 
municipaux de zonage a révélé des obstacles importants dans l’utilisation des lois sur les 
droits de la personne pour atteindre l’égalité en matière de logement. Cet article compare 
le succès relatif des contestations judiciaires des règlements municipaux qui régissent les 
foyers de groupe logeant les personnes handicapées, aux règlements municipaux qui 
régissent les maisons de chambres logeant les personnes qui n’ont pas les moyens de se 
payer d’autre logement. Cette comparaison démontre les difficultés liées au fait de 
contester la discrimination envers un groupe de personnes diffus qui tombe sous 
plusieurs motifs de distinction interdits (les résidents de maisons de chambres), plutôt 
qu’un groupe distinct qui tombe sous un seul motif identifiable (les résidents des foyers 
de groupe). Elle révèle aussi les défis rencontrés en contestant la discrimination lorsque 
les iniquités procédurales sont enracinées dans les processus de prise de décision 
municipaux. Nous concluons que le plus grand défi auquel les défenseurs du droit au 
logement et des droits de la personne sont confrontés, en plus de l’élimination des 
règlements municipaux discriminatoires, est de faire face à la discrimination systémique 
dans les politiques et les pratiques en matière de logement. Le litige est un outil précieux 
pour relever ce défi mais ne constitue qu’une partie de la solution. 
 
In Ontario, it is the role of local government to ensure that housing is accessible and to 
eliminate barriers to housing. This paper examines how the Ontario Human Rights Code 
can be employed to challenge municipal zoning bylaws regulating permitted land-uses, 
namely by establishing that certain bylaws adversely affect individuals protected under 
the Code by restricting where those individuals may live. While Ontario litigants have 
been relatively successful in using the Code to challenge direct and indirect 
discrimination in housing, the case of zoning bylaws reveals key limitations to achieving 
housing equality through human rights legislation. This paper compares the relative 
success of legal challenges to bylaws regulating group homes that house people with 
disabilities to bylaws regulating rooming houses that house people who cannot afford 
other housing. This comparison reveals the difficulty of challenging discrimination faced 
by a diffuse group of individuals falling within multiple prohibited grounds (residents of 
rooming houses), rather than a discrete group that falls under a single identifiable ground 
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(residents of group homes). It also reveals the challenges of confronting discrimination 
when procedural inequalities are entrenched in municipal decision-making processes. It 
concludes that the larger challenge for housing and human rights advocates, in addition 
to eliminating discriminatory bylaws, is to confront systemic discrimination in housing 
policy and practice. In this task, litigation is a valuable tool but only part of the solution.    
 
ZONING IS A REGULATORY PLANNING TOOL USED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS to designate 
permitted land-uses of privately owned land.
1
 Municipalities regulate the use of land by passing 
bylaws that stipulate how land may be used, where buildings or structures may be located, and 
the types of buildings that are permitted.
2
 The purpose of these bylaws is to control the 
development of communities, taking social, economic and environmental considerations into 
account.
3
 Such bylaws ensure that new developments do not interfere with existing communities, 
preserving their character and protecting them from potentially conflicting or dangerous land-
uses. Effective land-use planning can also support the development of inclusive neighbourhoods 
in which all members of the community have access to the services they require. 
 In this paper, I examine three forms of discrimination—direct discrimination, indirect 
discrimination, and systemic discrimination—and the impact of human rights legislation on 
municipal zoning bylaws that govern land-use for group homes and rooming houses. Direct 
discrimination is prohibited in municipal planning, as local governments cannot regulate “users 
of the land” through zoning bylaws. Instead they must zone for “land-use.” As a result, zoning 
bylaws are facially neutral in that they do not directly discriminate through “people-zoning.” 
However, zoning bylaws that regulate the “land-use” of particular kinds of housing have been 
challenged as indirect discrimination at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) and 
Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). Claimants have argued that bylaws developed by 
municipalities in southern Ontario adversely impact individuals protected under the Ontario 
Human Rights Code. In regulating the way land is used by prohibiting particular forms of 
housing in specific areas, by setting minimum separation distances between particular forms of 
housing, or by limiting the number of people who can live in a particular form of housing, 
municipal governments influence where people can live and the social composition of 
neighbourhoods.
4
 For example, distancing requirements between group homes restrict where 
people with mental and physical disabilities are able to live. Such bylaws adversely affect the 
accessibility of accommodation and the choice of residency of identified groups. In response to 
these challenges, some local governments have amended bylaws to ensure that they conform 
with Ontario’s Human Rights Code. Successes in this area confirm that municipalities have a 
duty to address human rights considerations in municipal planning.  
 The Human Rights Code has played a central role in human rights enforcement by 
providing a mechanism through which individuals can challenge bylaws that are facially neutral 
but adversely impact individuals protected by the Code. The Code has also been instrumental in 
requiring municipalities to proactively comply with human rights legislation when developing 
bylaws. The Code is a powerful tool that not only protects fundamental rights by providing 
                                                        
1
 Ian Skelton, Keeping them at bay: Practices of municipal exclusion (Winnipeg: Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2012) at 2, online: <policyalternatives.ca/publications/commentary/keeping-them-bay-practices-
municiple-exclusion> [perma.cc/XL29-DEVR].   
2
 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Citizen’s Guide: Zoning By-Laws, No 3 (Toronto: Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing, Provincial Planning Policy Branch, 2010) at 2 [Citizen’s Guide, No 3]. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Skelton, supra note 1 at 4. 
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redress for past discrimination but also aims to interrupt patterns of discrimination and uproot 
institutionalized practices that repeatedly undermine inclusion and equality. 
 In this paper, I first provide an overview of the statutory framework—notably, the 
Planning Act and Human Rights Code—in which human rights claims are made against zoning 
bylaws. I then describe the nature of such claims, focusing first on direct discrimination in 
zoning, followed by indirect or adverse effect discrimination. I argue that the success of 
challenges to zoning bylaws that regulate group homes demonstrates the potential of human 
rights legislation to create an environment of substantive equality for Ontarians with disabilities. 
However, this case study also reveals key limitations to achieving equality through human rights 
legislation, particularly due to systemic discrimination which pervades and reinforces the 
exclusion of certain people from our communities.  
 After describing successful challenges to zoning bylaws, I focus on two significant 
setbacks. The first is the difficulty of challenging discrimination when bylaws adversely impact a 
diverse group of people who fall within different prohibited grounds of discrimination, as 
compared to a discrete group of people who clearly fall under a single identity-based Code-
protected ground. To illustrate this challenge, I compare the relative success of Torontonians 
challenging two kinds of zoning bylaws: zoning bylaws that regulate group homes which house 
people with disabilities; and those that regulate rooming houses which house people who cannot 
afford other forms of housing. Although many low-income people living in rooming houses fall 
within various Code-protected groups, including people with disabilities, single persons who 
receive social assistance, newcomers and so on,
5
 due to the diffuse nature of discrimination in 
this context, zoning bylaws regulating rooming houses have been difficult to challenge and 
remain in place. 
 The second difficulty I identify is the inequality that is embedded in decision-making 
processes at the local level. Negative assumptions about the “type of people” who live in certain 
forms of housing (such as group homes, rooming houses and shelters) and the phenomenon of 
“Not In My Back Yard” or NIMBY-ism have a profound impact on both the way local 
governments make decisions and the decisions that are ultimately made. In these situations, the 
decision-making process itself becomes a source of discrimination. Procedural inequality also 
exists in the failure to “investigate the possibilities of accommodation [and the] exclusion of 
historically disadvantaged groups from decision-making.” 6  These community attitudes and 
decision-making processes are difficult to challenge in courts, tribunals or boards, allowing 
systemic discrimination to persist. 
This paper concludes by outlining some of the ways in which these obstacles may be 
overcome. A number of actors, including the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) and 
OMB, play an important role in fostering a human rights culture in Ontario by providing 
recommendations on how to embed the spirit of human rights law and values of equality into 
processes, practices and policy at the local level. Ultimately, the experience of discriminatory 
zoning illustrates that human rights legislation is transformative not only because it can be used 
to combat inequality through legal action or through proactive compliance, but also because of 
its normative potential in fostering systemic equality. 
                                                        
5
 OHRC Submission on the City of Toronto Draft City-wide Zoning By-law, report no PG21.1 (Toronto: Ontario 
Human Rights Commission, 2013) at 4 [OHRC PG21.1]. 
6
 Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 147. 
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I.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE NEXUS BETWEEN HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW AND ZONING BYLAWS 
 
The built environment of cities shapes communities and the people that live in them. Section 
34(1) of Ontario’s Planning Act grants councils of local municipalities the power to pass and 
enforce zoning bylaws. In particular, city councils can restrict land-use by “prohibiting the use of 
land, for or except for such purposes as may be set out in the bylaw within the 
municipality . . . ”7 Zoning is one of the few legal tools that municipalities use to regulate land-
use and manage the development of cities.
8
 In exercising this power, city councils control how 
land may be used in general by carving out residential, commercial or industrial areas, and how 
specific plots of land may be used by, for example, restricting the kinds of buildings permitted in 
certain areas or establishing particular requirements for buildings, such as lot sizes, parking and 
building heights.
9
   
The Planning Act empowers local governments to regulate land-use through zoning 
bylaws; however, due to the quasi-constitutional nature of the Ontario Human Rights Code, 
municipal governments must ensure that bylaws enacted under the Planning Act do not 
discriminate on the basis of identity-based grounds set out in the Code. The primacy of the Code 
over other statutes is set out in section 47(2), which states, “where the provisions of the Code 
conflict with provisions in another provincial law, it is the provisions of the Code that are to 
apply.”10 The Code takes precedence over all other legislation in Ontario, including the Planning 
Act and zoning bylaws.  
The Code prohibits discrimination in five areas of social interaction, one of which is 
accommodation or housing.
11
 Section 2(1) of the Code provides that:  
 
Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of 
accommodation without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, 
colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
gender expression, age, marital status, family status, disability or the receipt of public 
assistance.
12
  
 
This provision protects against discrimination in housing on sixteen grounds of differentiation, 
“which operate most frequently to disadvantage and prejudice individuals in society.”13 The 
Code works to prevent discrimination in housing and to eliminate it at both an individual and a 
systemic level.  
                                                        
7
 Planning Act, RSO 1990, c P13, s 34(1) 1. [Planning Act]. 
8
 Prashan Ranasinghe & Mariana Valverde, “Governing Homelessness Through Land-use: A Sociolegal Study of 
the Toronto Shelter Zoning By-law” (2006) 31:3 Canadian Journal of Sociology 325 at 327 [Ranasinghe & 
Valverde]. 
9
 Citizen’s Guide, No 3, supra note 2. 
10
 Tranchemontagne v Ontario, 2006 SCC 14 at para 34 [Tranchemontagne]; Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-
19, s 42(2) [Human Rights Code]. 
11
 Mary Cornish, Fay Faraday & Jo-Anne Pickel, Enforcing Human Rights in Ontario (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 
2009) at 1 [Cornish, Faraday & Pickel]. 
12
 Human Rights Code, supra note 10, s 2(1). 
13
 Cornish, Faraday & Pickel, supra note 11 at 35. 
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The test to establish discrimination under the Code was developed by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Meiorin.
14
 Claimants must establish prima facie discrimination by demonstrating 
that they possess a characteristic that is protected from discrimination under the Code, that they 
have been adversely impacted by a policy or practice, and that they have experienced the adverse 
impact due to the Code-protected characteristic.
15
 In other words, they must prove adverse 
treatment owing to a prohibited ground. Once the claimant has established prima facie 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the respondent to justify the impugned policy or practice. The 
respondent must show that the policy or practice: (a) was adopted for a purpose that is rationally 
connected to the function being performed; (b) was adopted in an honest or good faith belief that 
it was necessary to fulfill the purpose; and (c) is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose 
such that it is impossible to accommodate the person without imposing undue hardship on the 
respondent.
16
 If the respondent cannot show that the policy or practice is justified, discrimination 
has occurred. 
This test aims to achieve both formal and substantive equality because the right to be free 
from discrimination involves the right to be free from both direct and adverse-effect 
discrimination. Formal equality exists when everyone is treated alike. Yet, facially neutral 
policies and practices can impact individuals disproportionately or disadvantageously due to 
specific traits or characteristics they hold.
17
 Substantive equality focuses on the outcome or 
effects of policies and practices, and asks whether the same treatment produces unequal results.
18
  
Substantive equality is achieved when the underlying differences of individuals are considered 
and accommodated so that the impact of a policy or practice does not result in disadvantage.
19
  
In the housing context, the Code is most often used to challenge discrete cases of 
discrimination experienced by particular individuals where they allege that they have personally 
been discriminated against. Discrimination in housing, however, can also be systemic—not just 
in the sense that the personal experience of discrimination is widespread amongst many 
individuals who belong to Code-protected groups, but also in the sense that discrimination has 
been institutionalized in the policies and practices that impact the availability of and access to 
housing. In this paper, I focus on the latter and examine how bylaws create and perpetuate a 
system of relative disadvantage for people presumably protected from discrimination by the 
Code.
20
 As I will discuss below, there have been notable successes in challenging exclusionary 
zoning bylaws that discriminate both directly and indirectly. After examining these successes, I 
turn to the limits and possibilities of human rights legislation in countering systemic 
discrimination in housing. 
                                                        
14
 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government Service 
Employees’ Union, 1999 SCC 48 [Meiorin]. 
15
 Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para 33 [Moore].  
16
 Meiorin, supra note 14 at para 54. 
17
 Cornish, Faraday & Pickel, supra note 11 at 39.  
18
 Ibid.. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ontario Human Rights Commission, In the zone: Housing, human rights and municipal planning (Toronto: 
Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2012) at 6, online: <ohrc.on.ca/en/zone-housing-human-rights-and-municipal-
planning>  [perma.cc/E95H-TSUE] [Ontario Human Rights Commission].  
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II. DIRECT AND INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION IN ZONING 
BYLAWS 
 
A. FORMAL EQUALITY AND DIRECT DISCRIMINATION IN ZONING 
BYLAWS 
 
Formal equality is achieved when people are treated alike under the law, and is violated when 
people are explicitly included or excluded based on a certain trait or characteristic. This disparate 
treatment is called direct discrimination. Historically, zoning bylaws were directly discriminatory 
in that they regulated where certain kinds of people or families could live. For example, some 
municipalities had zoning bylaws that prohibited people of certain ethnicities or races from 
living in particular communities while others had bylaws that specified that only “single family” 
dwelling units were permitted in a specific residential community.
21
  
Today, section 35(2) of Ontario’s Planning Act states that municipalities may not pass 
zoning bylaws that “[have] the effect of distinguishing between persons who are related and 
persons who are unrelated in respect of the occupancy or use of a building…”22 This provision 
reflects the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bell v Regina which struck down a bylaw in 
North York, Ontario that defined a “dwelling unit” as a living quarter designed or intended for 
use by an individual or family, and defined “family” as two or more people “living together and 
interrelated by bonds of consanguinity, marriage or legal adoption, occupying a dwelling unit.”23 
The Court established that while it is the prerogative of local government to zone for “land-use,” 
it does not have the right to zone for “users of the land.”24 Spence J, writing for the majority, 
held that permitting only families as occupants of self-contained dwelling units is, “such 
oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no 
justification in the minds of reasonable men … [T]he Legislature never intended to make such 
rules and the device of zoning by relationships of occupants rather than the use of the 
building.”25 The Supreme Court of Canada also stated that personal characteristics or qualities 
are not a proper basis on which to develop zoning bylaws meant to control density or address 
other legitimate planning concerns.
26
  
 This case prohibits municipalities from “people-zoning” on the basis that it is only within 
the jurisdiction of local governments to zone for land-uses. Although not based on human rights 
law, the effect of this limitation is that municipalities cannot directly discriminate by regulating 
who can and cannot live within particular areas. Zoning bylaws, as a result, are facially neutral in 
that they apply to everyone equally, without explicitly permitting or prohibiting specific 
individuals from living in a given community based on the traits or characteristics that they hold.  
                                                        
21
 Skelton, supra note 1.  
22
 Planning Act, supra note 7, s 35(2). 
23
 Skelton, supra note 1 at 18; Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario v Kitchener, [2010] OMBD PL050611 at para 
36 [Advocacy Centre]; Regina v Bell, [1979] 2 SCR 212 at 220, Spence J [Bell].  
24
 Advocacy Centre, supra note 23; Skelton, supra note 1 at 8. 
25
 Bell, supra note 23 at 223; Kruse v Johnson, [1898] 2 QB 1 at 99-100, Lord Russell CJ. 
26
 Advocacy Centre, supra note 23; Bell, supra note 23 at 221.  
31
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B. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AND INDIRECT OR ADVERSE EFFECTS 
DISCRIMINATION IN ZONING BYLAWS 
 
The concept of indirect or adverse effects discrimination recognizes that although a policy or 
practice is facially neutral in that it applies to everyone equally, it may adversely affect particular 
individuals due to the traits or characteristics that they hold. Where the impact of a policy or 
practice produces unequal results, indirect or adverse effects discrimination exists. Human rights 
legislation seeks to protect substantive equality and has proven to be a powerful tool in 
challenging indirect or adverse effects discrimination. The substantive equality approach 
demands that any policy or practice that differentially impacts individuals due to a Code-
protected ground they hold be eradicated or changed to account for the underlying differences 
between individuals and to neutralize the impact of the policy or practice. Duty holders bear the 
responsibility of accommodating difference and proactively ensuring equality of outcome.
27
  
This is profoundly different from the notion of accommodation that existed prior to Meiorin, in 
which a policy or practice would remain in place despite its differential impact but an 
accommodation in the form of an exception would be made for specific individuals who were 
adversely impacted by the policy or practice.
28
  
The Court in Meiorin eradicated the distinction between direct and adverse effects 
discrimination, and developed a transformative approach to achieve substantive equality through 
human rights legislation. This concept was developed by Shelagh Day and Gwen Brodsky, who 
critiqued the former model of accommodation on the basis that “[i]t allows those who consider 
themselves ‘normal’ to continue to construct institutions and relations in their image, as long as 
others, when they challenge this construction are ‘accommodated’.” 29  Day and Brodsky 
suggested that to achieve substantive equality, human rights legislation must impose a duty to 
accommodate that requires duty-bearers to develop policies and practices that take diversity into 
account from the outset, that are inclusive of difference, and that eliminate or remedy the adverse 
effects of facially neutral policies and practices.
30
  
As described above, zoning bylaws are facially neutral because municipalities cannot 
regulate users of the land. Instead, municipalities must determine appropriate land-uses and base 
planning decisions on legitimate planning considerations regarding the use of the land. Zoning 
theoretically “allows the segregation and compartmentalization of spaces according to uses… not 
persons.”31 However, although “zoning formally controls land-uses, it effectively also controls 
people who may or may not use the land and consequently their ways of life.”32 In particular, in 
regulating where land may be used within municipalities for certain forms of housing such as 
supportive housing, residential care facilities, group homes, boarding houses or rooming houses, 
zoning bylaws can have a disproportionate effect on individuals living in these kinds of homes.  
Local governments have a duty to accommodate individuals protected under the Code. 
To fulfill this duty, city councils must consider whether facially neutral bylaws are 
                                                        
27
 Cornish, Faraday & Pickel, supra note 11 at 39-40. 
28
 Ibid at 40.  
29
 Meiorin, supra note 14 at para 41; Shelagh Day & Gwen Brodsky, “The Duty to Accommodate: Who Will 
Benefit?” (1996) 75 Can Bar Rev 433 [Day & Brodsky]. 
30
 Meiorin, supra note 14 at para 41; Day & Brodsky, supra note 29; Moore, supra note 15 at para 61. 
31
 Ranasinghe & Valverde, supra note 8 at 327-328.  
32
 Skelton, supra note 1 at 2.  
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discriminatory in effect or adversely impact members of their communities who are protected by 
the Code.
33
 It is only by changing or eradicating seemingly innocuous land-use bylaws that have 
discriminatory effects that local government may uphold substantive equality and work towards 
genuine inclusiveness.  
 
C. CHALLENGING ADVERSE EFFECTS DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
REGULATION OF GROUP HOMES: SUCCESSES IN KITCHENER, 
TORONTO, SMITHS FALLS AND SARNIA 
 
Over the past few years, grassroots groups and non-profit organizations have brought human 
rights claims against a number of municipalities in southern Ontario, challenging zoning bylaws 
that regulate group homes. Group homes are defined by the City of Toronto as, “premises used to 
provide supervised living accommodation, licensed or funded under the Province of Ontario or 
Government of Canada legislation, for three to ten persons… living together in a single 
housekeeping unit because they require a group living arrangement.”34 Group homes specifically 
provide supportive housing to people with physical, developmental, or mental health disabilities; 
they are places where people who require group living arrangements due to emotional, mental, 
social or physical conditions can live.   
Since disability is a ground that is protected by the Code, claimants have challenged 
zoning bylaws restricting where group homes may be located within municipalities on the basis 
that they adversely impact individuals with disabilities. The Ontario Human Rights Commission 
has also repeatedly stated that bylaws regulating group homes, such as those which require a 
minimum separation distance between group homes, further limit the availability of housing 
options for marginalized people, create additional barriers to affordable and supportive housing, 
and preclude the ability of individuals with disabilities to live in certain communities.
35
 These 
bylaws impact the choice, cost and availability of housing for people with disabilities.
36
 
Although facially neutral, land-use bylaws that regulate group homes have been found to have a 
disproportionately negative effect on people protected by the Code. 
In 2010, the OMB decided an unprecedented case at the nexus between land-use controls 
and human rights.
37
 In this case, the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) challenged 
municipal zoning bylaws in the City of Kitchener that limited or banned the development of new 
residential care facilities and assisted housing in a neighbourhood called Cedar Hill to respond to 
the “overconcentration of single person low-income households” and “residential care facilities 
and social/supportive housing.” 38 The City’s objective was to develop a bylaw that decentralized 
institutions, fostered a neighbourhood mix, and distributed such facilities throughout the 
municipality.
39
 
Although the OMB found that the city’s objectives for implementing these bylaws were 
reasonable, the OMB was unconvinced that the potential discriminatory consequences of the 
                                                        
33
 Human Rights Code, supra note 10, s 2(1). 
34
 City of Toronto, By-law No 569-2013, Zoning By-law (9 May 2012), s 800.50(325) [By-law No 569-2013].  
35
 Ontario Human Rights Commission, supra note 20 at 25. 
36
 Terry Pender, “City of Kitchener to scrap minimum distance rules for group homes,” The Record (18 June 2012), 
online: <therecord.com> [perma.cc/KPC3-JBW4]. 
37
 Advocacy Centre, supra note 23 at para 1.  
38
 Ibid para 2.  
39
 Ibid at paras 2, 39. 
33
Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 25 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol25/iss1/2
 8 
bylaws had been fully considered because the effect of the municipality’s initiative was to 
exclude persons with physical or mental disabilities and recipients of social assistance—the 
primary users of residential care facilities, assisted housing and lodging houses—from new 
developments in Cedar Hill. The OMB did not ultimately decide whether the City of Kitchener 
violated the Code but gave city council fifteen months to assess the impact of these bylaws on 
people protected by the Code and redraft its initiative with Code objectives in mind.  
It is particularly important that in its reasons, the OMB asserted that municipalities are 
bound by the Code and must fulfill their obligations towards rights holders when drafting zoning 
bylaws. The OMB emphasized that any bylaw or planning instrument that has a discriminatory 
effect is prohibited under the Code, unless the municipality can justify the imposition of the 
discriminatory policy.
40
 Moreover, the OMB concluded that it has the jurisdiction to consider the 
human rights implications of bylaws in cases before it, and will assert this jurisdiction in the 
future.
41
 The City of Kitchener repealed its bylaw banning certain forms of housing in Cedar Hill 
in June 2012.
42
 
The Dream Team, a mental health advocacy organization, brought a similar human rights 
challenge to the HRTO against the City of Toronto in 2010. The Dream Team alleged that 
zoning bylaws requiring minimum separation distances of 250-metres between group homes and 
residential care facilities discriminated against people with disabilities.
43
 Minimum separation 
distances are a planning tool used to avoid the overconcentration of certain land-uses. In some 
circumstances, minimum-distance bylaws are considered a legitimate planning tool. For example, 
in 2004, the OMB upheld Toronto’s bylaw requiring a 250 metre separation distance between 
homeless shelters.
44
 The OMB found that this bylaw was grounded in sound policy principles—
namely, avoiding the concentrated of shelters in a particular area and ensuring that shelters are 
spread throughout the city.
 45
 It also concluded that a shelter cannot truly be considered 
“housing.” 46  In the context of group homes, which are a form of “housing,” the HRTO 
recognized the responsibility of municipalities towards people protected by the Code. Although 
it never determined whether Toronto’s minimum-distance bylaws were discriminatory, in an 
interim decision rejecting the city’s request for early dismissal, Adjudicator Michael Gottheil 
stated that the Dream Team’s “application raises important, and in some respects novel legal 
issues concerning the interplay between the particular circumstances, needs and conditions of 
people facing mental illness and a municipality’s legitimate interest in regulating land-use and 
the way it may exercise its planning authority.”47 Gottheil determined that the HRTO is an 
appropriate forum in which to decide whether zoning bylaws infringe the Code and that the 
parties should have the opportunity to present evidence and make full legal arguments regarding 
whether minimum-distance bylaws are indeed discriminatory.
48
  
In response to the Dream Team’s legal challenge of Toronto’s bylaws regulating group 
homes, a Staff Report was released on 4 October  2013 in which municipal planning staff 
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recommended to city council that group homes with up to ten residents be permitted in all 
residential areas as-of-right and those with over ten residents be permitted in zones that allow for 
higher intensity development.
49
 City staff made this recommendation on the basis that minimum 
resident requirements and mandatory separation distances were not justified in light of the Code 
and its protection of people with disabilities, and therefore that this bylaw was discriminatory.
50
 
City council repealed the mandatory separation distance requirement for group homes and 
residential care facilities in June 2014.
51
 
In addition to Toronto, the Dream Team brought human rights challenges in 2010 against 
Smiths Falls, Kitchener, and Sarnia aimed at discriminatory zoning bylaws regulating group 
homes. In response, Smiths Falls removed the offensive cap that restricted the total number of 
disabled people that could live in all group homes within its municipal boundaries to thirty-six.
52
 
Smith Falls also removed a mandatory 300-metre separation distance between group homes.
53
 
Kitchener negotiated a settlement in which it agreed to change its bylaw that required group 
homes to be at least 400 metres apart.
54
 Sarnia proactively amended its bylaw in 2010 to remove 
all regulations restricting where group homes can be built and allowed group homes as-of-right 
in all residential use zones.
55
  
These successes demonstrate that local governments must consider the discriminatory 
effects of zoning bylaws and re-examine their approach to planning by ensuring that policies are 
sound from both a municipal planning perspective and a human rights perspective. Human rights 
legislation provides a legal framework through which indirect or adverse effects discrimination 
can be challenged and requires local governments to proactively accommodate people protected 
by the Code. The Code therefore plays an important role in achieving substantive equality and 
genuine inclusiveness in our communities.  
 
III. SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION AND THE LIMITS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION  
 
While human rights law can provide a mechanism by which Code-protected groups may 
challenge specific bylaws that disproportionately impact them and thereby combat both direct 
and adverse effects discrimination, in this section I explore the limitations of human rights 
legislation in achieving equality. After defining the concept of systemic discrimination, I use the 
case study of rooming house zoning in Toronto to illustrate two shortcomings of human rights 
legislation in rooting out discrimination. First, where policies disadvantage or adversely impact 
                                                        
49
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individuals on a variety of prohibited grounds instead of one specific ground, it is very difficult 
to successfully establish discrimination. Second, human rights legislation struggles to address 
discriminatory decision-making processes wherein community members engage in NIMBY-ism 
and disadvantaged people are excluded. As a result, discrimination persists and remains 
embedded in our municipalities.  
 
A. DEFINING SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION 
 
Systemic discrimination is difficult to define and to identify. In Action Travail des Femme v 
Canadian National Railway Company, the Supreme Court adopted the explanation of systemic 
discrimination that Justice Abella developed in the Abella Report on equality in employment.
56
 
Although Abella J did not provide a precise definition of systemic discrimination, she explains 
that:  
 
[d]iscrimination… means practices and attitudes that have, whether by design or 
impact, the effect of limiting an individual’s or group’s right to the opportunities 
generally available because of attributed or rather than actual characteristics… 
 
It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an intentional 
desire to obstruct someone's potential, or whether it is the accidental by-product of 
innocently motivated practices or systems. If the barrier is affecting certain groups 
in a disproportionately negative way, it is a signal that the practices that lead to this 
adverse impact may be discriminatory. 
 
This is why it is important to look at the results of a system… [emphasis added].57  
 
Like adverse effects discrimination, systemic discrimination results from the operation of 
practices and procedures that are not designed to promote discrimination, yet nevertheless 
adversely affect particular individuals due to attributed or actual characteristics that they 
possess.
58
 This characterization of systemic discrimination was also reflected in Meiorin in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada explained that systemic discrimination occurs when 
adverse-effect discrimination “arises in the aggregate to the level of systemic discrimination.”59 
Both definitions suggest that systemic discrimination goes beyond individual instances of 
discrimination; it is a deeper form of discrimination that underlies both obvious direct 
discrimination and the subtle adverse-effect discrimination.
60
  
Systemic discrimination results in widespread inequality that persists and becomes 
embedded in institutions and attitudes. This form of discrimination exists when discrimination is 
so deeply rooted that it shapes society’s understanding of what is normal. In Action Travail, 
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Dickson C.J. explains that in these circumstances, discrimination is “reinforced by the very 
exclusion of the disadvantaged group because the exclusion fosters the belief, both within and 
outside the group, that the exclusion is the result of ‘natural’ forces.”61 When discrimination and 
inequality is normalized, instances of discrimination arise because people do things the way they 
have always done them and people do not make the connection between human rights and their 
decisions or actions.
62
  
Colleen Sheppard aptly explains that when inequality is normalized, it is perpetuated 
because “inequitable norms and standards become the unquestioned backdrop upon which anti-
discrimination laws are required to function.”63  Sheppard emphasizes that it is important to 
recognize that systemic discrimination is not only reinforced because it is institutionalized in 
policies and practices but because it is socially constructed and because those who are 
“overrepresented… in various social institutions have shaped our understanding of what is 
normal.” 64  For Sheppard, “systemic discrimination arises when systems, practices and 
institutions of mainstream society reflect and reinforce the norms, attributes and privileges of the 
dominant group.” 65  It is both the institutional and social dynamic of discrimination that 
entrenches, legitimizes and reproduces inequality and exclusion.
66
 Since norms and standards are 
the source of exclusion, systemic discrimination is incredibly challenging to identify, let alone 
uproot.
67
 
In Action Travail des Femmes, Dickson CJ writes, “to combat systemic discrimination, it 
is essential to create a climate in which both negative practices and attitudes can be challenged 
and discouraged.”68 While human rights legislation can be used to challenge manifestations of 
systemic discrimination such as specific policies and practices, the norms and attitudes that 
reinforce systemic discrimination often remain beyond the reach of human rights law and thus 
elude redress. The goal of transformation, which lies at the heart of the equality project, is 
largely unattainable because the law is relatively powerless to challenge the norms and attitudes 
that result in discriminatory policies and practices. To advance the equality project, it is 
necessary to identify and confront the norms and attitudes that reinforce exclusion.  
 
B. THE CASE STUDY OF ROOMING HOUSES IN TORONTO 
 
As discussed above, discriminatory bylaws regulating group homes have been challenged with 
relative success by demonstrating that they adversely affect people who are disabled by limiting 
their housing options. This has necessitated a move towards enacting inclusive bylaws that 
permit group homes in all residential areas as-of-right and that accommodate people with 
disabilities, increasing access to housing throughout Ontario’s municipalities. In contrast, in the 
case of rooming houses, bylaws that severely restrict where rooming houses can be located 
remain in place despite sustained advocacy calling for the elimination of these bylaws and the 
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position advanced by experts, including the Ontario Human Rights Commission, that rooming 
house bylaws infringe the human rights of Code-protected groups.  
Rooming houses are regulated through zoning bylaws and/or licensing in many 
municipalities throughout Ontario, including Toronto, due to legitimate planning, development 
and health and safety concerns. The City of Toronto’s municipal bylaw on rooming houses 
defines “rooming house” as a “building in which living accommodation is provided for at least 
three persons in separate rooms, each of which may have food preparation facilities or sanitary 
facilities, but not both.”69 In other words, a rooming house is a building in which three or more 
individuals who are not related rent a single room and share common spaces, including a kitchen 
and/or bathrooms.  
Since individuals are able to rent one room of a rooming house instead of an entire 
apartment, rooming houses are widely considered an affordable form of housing.
70
 The cost of 
renting a room in a rooming house ranges from approximately $350 to $500. This is far below 
the Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation’s average market rent for the Greater Toronto 
Area, which was $822 for a bachelor and $979 for a one-bedroom apartment in 2007-2011.
71
 As 
such, rooming houses “are one of the only feasible housing options for people on welfare 
($585/month) and disability support ($1020/month) in Ontario.”72 Bachelors and one-bedroom 
units in the private sector are unaffordable for these individuals, unless they are provided with a 
rent supplement. Besides those on social assistance and disability support, rooming houses 
provide affordable housing to seniors, students, immigrants, low-income singles and families, 
and others who do not have access to other forms of affordable housing.
73
 
Prior to amalgamation in 1998, the City of Toronto consisted of six separate 
municipalities. Each of the former municipalities had its own bylaws regulating rooming houses 
and these bylaws remained in place following the amalgamation. As a result, rooming houses in 
Toronto are regulated through a patchwork of zoning bylaws and are inconsistent throughout the 
city.
74
 While rooming houses are legal and regulated through licensing and inspections in 
Etobicoke, York, and Toronto, a “rooming house” is not a permitted land-use in Scarborough, 
East York, and North York. In some parts of the amalgamated city, rooming houses are 
prohibited in all residential zones, while in others licensing bylaws provide permissive but not 
as-of-right zoning.
75
 On 9 May 2013, the City of Toronto enacted a consolidated or amalgamated 
city-wide zoning bylaw that harmonized the vast majority of bylaws across the city. Although 
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bylaws regulating other land-uses were consolidated, including those regulating group homes, 
city council chose not to consolidate bylaws regulating rooming houses, leaving them to be dealt 
with at a later date.  
The number of rooming houses in the former City of Toronto has been declining for 
decades. While there were 870 licensed rooming houses in 1985 and 501 licensed rooming 
houses in 2003, as of October 2008, City records indicated that there were 445 licensed rooming 
houses.
76
 The 445 rooming houses were estimated to contain 7,100 rooms and accommodated 
about 8,900 individuals.
77
 Only 412 licensed rooming houses were reported as of May 2012.
78
  
Meanwhile, reports on rooming houses in Toronto estimate that thousands of individuals 
live in unlicensed rooming houses throughout the city.
79
 For example, a report commissioned by 
the City of Toronto concluded that there was evidence of “the widespread existence of illegal 
rooming houses across the amalgamated City” and “that the number of such rooming houses 
equals or exceeds the number of licensed rooming houses.”80 Another report used 2006 census 
data on the number of low-income single adults in Toronto and, after accounting for the probable 
number of people who live in licensed rooming houses, supportive housing, and other forms of 
rent-geared-to-income housing, deduced that little is known about where 100,000  low-income 
singles live in the amalgamated city except that many singles live in unlicensed rooming houses 
and many of these rooming houses are located in the former municipalities of Etobicoke, York, 
North York, Scarborough and York.
81
 Recently, a 2014 qualitative report on rooming houses in 
Toronto published by the Wellesley Institute confirmed that the number of unlicensed rooming 
houses is growing in Toronto’s inner city suburbs where rooming houses are illegal.82  
It is important to highlight that the inner city suburbs in which rooming houses are not 
permitted, and are therefore illegal, are also the city’s poorest areas. David Hulchanski’s study, 
The Three Cities within Toronto, the United Way of Greater Toronto’s study, Poverty by Postal 
Code, and John Stapleton’s study, The “Working Poor” in Toronto Region, each found an 
increased concentration of low-income earners and a growing number of high-poverty 
neighbourhoods in the northwestern and northeastern inner suburbs of Toronto.
83
 Of particular 
importance for this paper is the intensification of poverty in the former municipalities of 
Scarborough and North York where rooming houses remain illegal. The Wellesley Institute’s 
report on rooming houses emphasizes that, “despite their illegality in the majority of Toronto’s 
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inner suburbs, rooming house accommodations are an essential part of the affordable housing 
market.”84 The prohibition of rooming houses in the inner city suburbs contributes to the lack of 
affordable housing options in communities where people need them most. Moreover, prohibitive 
bylaws render tenants of illegal rooming houses vulnerable to abusive landlords and unsafe 
living conditions, and make rooming houses a precarious form of housing which may be shut 
down by the city if reported. 
Reports written by non-profit organizations, the Ontario Human Rights Commission, and 
the city staff repeatedly recommend that city council harmonize zoning bylaws across Toronto to 
permit rooming houses as-of-right.
85
 The current patchwork of bylaws regulating rooming 
houses is not grounded in a sound planning rationale; the inconsistencies in rooming house 
bylaws across the City of Toronto are indicative of their arbitrary nature. As well, these bylaws, 
which restrict the location of much needed forms of housing for people protected by the Code, 
fall short of the Code and discriminate against those protected by the Code because they have the 
effect of creating barriers or denying access to affordable housing.
86
 For example, municipalities 
now recognize that the regulation of group homes requires human rights consideration because 
they provide accommodation specifically for people with disabilities. Yet, although not 
specifically for people with disabilities, these individuals also live in rooming houses due to their 
affordability. In fact, rooming houses provide one of the few rental rates that match disability 
support allowance. However, rooming house bylaws are even more discriminatory than bylaws 
regulating group homes; they do not just set minimum distances between group homes but are 
prohibited from entire areas of Toronto. Although the treatment of group homes and rooming 
houses by municipalities is disparate, the example above demonstrates that the same issues of 
discrimination exist in both contexts.  
The recommendation to allow rooming houses throughout Toronto as-of-right reinforces 
the responsibility of local governments under the Planning Act to “have regard to… the adequate 
provision of a full range of housing, including affordable housing” when carrying out their 
responsibilities under the Act.
87
 It is also consistent with the “Affordable Housing Action Plan” 
adopted by the City of Toronto in 2009, which emphasizes the need to preserve and expand the 
supply of affordable housing for single persons, including rooming houses.
88
 The Action Plan 
specifically states that for many of the city’s “most vulnerable residents, the availability of such 
options means the difference between being homeless and being housed.” 89  Despite the 
responsibility of municipalities to expand municipal housing option, the recommendations to 
allow rooming houses as-of-right and the largely arbitrary regulatory regime that governs 
rooming houses in Toronto, city council continued to defer action on this matter. The city finally 
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launched a Rooming House Review to identify and address issues relating to the conditions and 
regulation of rooming houses in the spring of 2015.    
 
C. THE CHALLENGE OF SPECIFYING A GROUND OF 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE FACE OF WIDESPREAD EXCLUSION 
 
As discussed above, systemic discrimination exists when discrimination is normalized. When 
this occurs, it is very difficult for human rights legislation to be employed successfully to 
challenge discriminatory policies or practices. It seems that the more widespread or typical the 
discrimination is, the more difficult it is to address. I suggest that this is one of the reasons why 
exclusionary rooming house bylaws have remained in place in Toronto. Although people who 
live in rooming houses, like residents of group homes, are adversely affected by zoning land-use 
regulations because they act as a barrier to accessing housing and restrict where individuals live 
within municipalities, individuals living in rooming houses are diverse; they are unified by the 
fact that they cannot afford other forms of housing, but they do not all fall within a single Code-
protected group. Compounding this problem is the fact that poverty or social condition is not a 
prohibited ground of discrimination in Ontario. As a result, claimants must establish prima facie 
discrimination by showing that rooming house bylaws adversely impact them as a result of a 
specific ground. The diversity of rooming house residents impacted by such bylaws makes it 
very difficult to prove discrimination on a particular ground and thus systemic discrimination 
persists in Toronto’s communities. 
To date, Toronto’s rooming house bylaws have not been challenged through legal claims. 
One of the reasons for this is the fact that unlike residents of group homes, those living in 
rooming houses fall within many Code-protected groups. Prior to challenging bylaws regulating 
group homes in Ontario’s municipalities, the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) 
researched many forms of housing regulated through zoning bylaws that “effectively [limit] the 
ability of an already vulnerable population to meet a basic human need: shelter.” 90  ACTO 
studied rooming houses, shelters, group homes, and supportive housing in order to decide how to 
focus its legal claim. ACTO ultimately focused its legal challenge on group homes because 
group homes are defined by the characteristics of their residents and serve the needs of people 
explicitly protected by the Code—those with mental and physical disabilities.91 ACTO wanted to 
develop a strong and focused case against people zoning that challenged a blatant form of 
discrimination in order to establish precedent and signal an end to the use of planning powers to 
regulate users of land.
92
 By focusing on group homes, ACTO was able to successfully challenge 
bylaws on a clear prohibited ground.
93
 The cohesive nature of the adversely affected group–
disabled group home residents–assisted ACTO in identifying the harm caused by the bylaw to a 
specific demographic and demonstrating prima facie discrimination.  
Establishing a prima facie discrimination claim in the regulation of rooming houses and 
other forms of affordable housing is more difficult because they are not defined by the 
characteristics of their residents and they do not serve a cohesive group of individuals that fall 
within a single Code ground, even though it is well established that they serve vulnerable groups 
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protected by human rights legislation.
94
 The Ontario Human Rights Commission recognized this 
in a letter to the City of Toronto’s Planning and Management Growth Committee in which it 
explained that rooming houses are “an essential form of affordable housing and [are] particularly 
important to people with disabilities, single people who receive social assistance, newcomers and 
other groups protected by Ontario’s Human Rights Code.” 95  However, the “defining 
characteristic of individuals living in rooming houses is their low income whether from social 
assistance, a disability pension, CPP or a low wage job.”96 While bylaws limiting access to 
rooming house accommodation adversely impact individuals protected by the Code, the unifying 
trait of rooming house residents is not a basis for a discrimination claim in Ontario, as “poverty” 
or “social condition” is not a prohibited ground in Ontario. As a result, “despite facing such 
strong barriers to equal participation in society, and despite being harshly stigmatized, poor 
people have no legal recourse for discrimination on the basis of poverty or social condition.”97 
Rooming house tenants and advocates must challenge rooming house bylaws indirectly by 
demonstrating that the zoning bylaws adversely impact them, not because they cannot afford 
other housing, but because they are single, have a disability and/or are immigrants. Proving that 
rooming houses are prima facie discriminatory on such a basis is very challenging.  
In 2000, the Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel chaired by the Honourable 
Gerard La Forest, released a report on its findings as to whether the Act adequately upheld 
human rights and equality principles in Canada.
98
 The report considered whether social condition 
should be added as a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Act. The Panel acknowledged 
the existence of discrimination against the poor, that poor people suffer because of stereotyping 
and the negative perception others hold about them, and that there is a close connection between 
the current grounds and the poverty suffered by those who share many of the personal 
characteristics referred to under the Act.
99
 The Panel also recognize how difficult it is to prove 
discrimination without the ground of social condition. The claimant is forced to take an indirect 
approach and prove that the impact of an infringing policy or practice is not due to the fact that 
they are poor, but due to some other Code-protected ground such as sex, disability, or marital 
status. Although some barriers related to poverty could be challenged on one or more existing 
grounds, these cases are rarely successful and are “difficult to prove because they do not 
challenge the discrimination directly.”100  The Panel further recognized that discrimination is 
even more difficult to prove when it arises from intersecting or multiple grounds such as the sex, 
disability and marital status of the complainant.
101
 On this point, the Panel concluded: “if a 
policy or practice adversely affects all poor people… a ground by ground consideration of the 
issue can be seen as a piecemeal solution that fails to take into account the cumulative effect of 
the problem.”102 The Panel ultimately supported the inclusion of social condition in human rights 
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legislation because it is essential to challenge stereotypes about the poor and protect the most 
destitute against discrimination.
 103
 
A similar conclusion was reached in a report for the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission. Its authors, Wayne MacKay and Natasha Kim, suggest that, “without adequate 
protection against discrimination on the basis of social condition, the risk of individuals “falling 
through the cracks” remains ever apparent for claimants who straddle an enumerated category 
and an unenumerated ground.”104 Like the La Forest Commission, they recommended adding 
social condition as a ground of discrimination to reflect the multifaceted and intersectional 
experience of discrimination, and to ensure that the rights of those on the margins of society are 
advanced.
105
 
These insights resonate in the case of rooming houses where tenants cannot afford other 
forms of housing because of a range of Code-protected attributes, and are adversely affected by 
zoning bylaws in Toronto that severely restrict where they may live, yet challenging zoning 
bylaws on one particular ground falls profoundly short in remedying the discrimination 
experienced by rooming house tenants. A ground-by-ground consideration of discriminatory 
zoning bylaws that affect many Code-protected groups fails to capture the reality and the 
complexities of discrimination experienced as a result of these bylaws. In an effort to distinguish 
between market-based exclusions and identity-based exclusions, human rights law falls short and 
fails to protect the rights of claimants.   
While many argue that adding poverty or social condition as a ground of discrimination 
would go a long way in sealing cracks that currently exist in human rights legislation, some 
academics argue that adding new grounds does not remedy the inherent problems with human 
rights legislation. These academics claim that human rights law is simply unequipped to combat 
systemic discrimination because it does not approach discrimination in a holistic way or work 
from a principled theory of what discrimination is and why it is wrong, but takes a piecemeal or 
pigeonhole approach that requires claimants to fit their claim into predetermined enumerated 
grounds of discrimination that reflects “a political and social reality to which the law has, 
belatedly, given recognition.” 106  This approach prevents adjudicators from identifying and 
addressing the harm caused by discrimination, and fails to respond to the lived realities of 
victims of human rights violations who are disadvantageously impacted by discriminatory 
policies and practices.
107
   
Denise Réaume, for example, criticizes human rights jurisprudence on the basis that it “is 
stuck in a style of adjudication that insists on matching litigants to prefabricated categories, 
rather than engaging in a process of continually redesigning the categories to meet human 
needs”.108 As a result, human rights law does not allow for the “opportunity to understand the 
subtleties of discrimination and its harmful effects.” 109  Ultimately for Réaume, “the human 
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phenomenon of discrimination–of those in relative positions of power denying full human status 
and opportunity to those in relative positions of disadvantage–is not capable of being codified in 
precise terms.” 110  This is particularly evident when discrimination is experienced by many 
individuals who are in a position of disadvantage due to a range of different attributes that they 
hold and this disadvantage becomes the norm. The complexity of discrimination in these 
circumstances does not fit nicely within human rights legislation’s codified notion of 
discrimination.  
One limitation of human rights legislation in Ontario is that when a claim does not fit 
within a specific identifiable ground, but instead affects people on the basis of many identity-
based grounds, the disadvantage is more difficult to identify and seems to be less deserving of 
the protection of human rights legislation. The case study of zoning bylaws suggests that when 
discrimination is so pervasive that many people are adversely affected by a policy as a result of 
attributes that they possess, the more difficult it is to challenge the impugned conduct or policy. 
The result is that systemic discrimination persists, immune from challenge by human rights 
legislation. 
 
D. DISCRIMINATORY ATTITUDES, NIMBY-ISM AND PROCEDURAL 
INEQUALITY 
 
Although the Human Rights Code enshrines the right to equal treatment with respect to housing, 
“Not in My Back Yard” (NIMBY) attitudes have arisen throughout Ontario to oppose as-of-right 
housing for certain land-uses, including group homes and rooming houses.
111
 NIMBYism refers 
to the protectionist attitudes and negative reactions from local residents to proposed new 
development.
112
 When decision-making processes at the municipal level involve NIMBYism,  
discriminatory attitudes infuse the processes, which undermines inclusiveness at the outset. This 
has significant implications, often resulting in a failure to consider possibilities of 
accommodation and the exclusion of disadvantaged groups from debates on issues that directly 
affect them.
113
 However, the discussions and attitudes involved in policy development are not 
directly susceptible to legal challenge and thus systemic discrimination persists within our 
communities.  
Public input is fundamental to local democracy and municipal decision-making often 
involves fairly extensive public participation.
114
 In fact, under the Planning Act, municipalities 
must hold at least one public meeting prior to amending zoning bylaws to provide a forum in 
which the public can make representations on and discuss the merits of the proposed plan.
115
 In 
these public meetings, city council must provide any member of the public wishing to speak on a 
proposed bylaw with a fair opportunity to do so.
116
 Residents use this opportunity to learn about 
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changes in their neighbourhood, ask questions, and voice concerns about or support proposals. 
Such public participation is mandatory and important to democracy at a local level, although 
extensive public debate can lengthen the time it takes to amend exclusionary bylaws and, due to 
imbalances of power within the process itself, may result in policies that reinforce the status quo 
of exclusion, rather than protect the rights of vulnerable people.
117
 
While the conduct and the format of public meetings is not prescribed by the Planning 
Act, the Act suggests that the content of planning discussions should focus on legitimate land use 
planning, not on the users of the land.
118
 However, public meetings and  discussions often focus 
on the future residents of proposed developments.
119
 For example, in the spring of 2015, the City 
of Toronto embarked on the first consultation phase of the Rooming House Review, which 
included fourteen neighbourhood-based consultations.
120
 Four of these consultations took place 
in the inner city suburb of Scarborough where rooming houses are currently illegal. While 
consultations in areas of Toronto where rooming houses are legal focused on improving the 
condition and regulation of rooming houses, Scarborough residents expressed vociferous concern 
and called for an outright ban on rooming houses throughout the city.
121
 Of the many concerns 
that Scarborough residents had, they felt “rooming houses compromise community safety by 
attracting the “wrong” types of people into the community and by encouraging dangerous, 
disruptive behaviours such as crime and drug use.”122 Such reactions are not uncommon. The 
Ontario Human Rights Commission has reported that “resistance to affordable housing is often 
based on stereotypes and misconceptions about the people who will live in it and the incorrect 
belief that it is acceptable to prevent certain groups of people from living in certain 
neighborhoods.”123 NIMBY attitudes reflect intolerance and prejudice based on “deeply held 
beliefs about the residents… including negative perceptions about their personal and moral 
habits, and assumptions about their ethnic backgrounds or racial status.”124 When discussions 
centre on the type of people that may live in the proposed form of housing and these residents are 
protected by one or more Code-grounds, public consultations are discriminatory.
125
  Although 
these are not legitimate planning considerations, such views and attitudes voiced during 
community consultations cannot be directly challenged under human rights law.  
Moreover, planning language is often used to hide discriminatory sentiments directed 
towards the “users of the land”. Residents conceal their concerns regarding the type of people 
who will live in the proposed housing by raising concerns regarding depreciated property values, 
population density, garbage, noise, changes to the neighbourhood, traffic and strains public 
services or the city’s infrastructure.126 While some of these concerns are legitimate and must be 
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examined further by municipal planners, the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation have argued that the majority of these concerns, which are 
often raised in resisting affordable housing initiatives, are unwarranted from a planning 
perspective.
127
 These reports state that affordable housing does not decrease property values, 
increase crime, strain public services, increase traffic, or change the character of 
neighbourhoods.
128
 In the context of group homes in Toronto, for example, a city staff report 
responded to some of these concerns and found that although the “impacts, nuisances and 
externalities generated by certain types of land-use must be considered, there is no documented 
evidence of any kind of negative externality generated by group homes.” 129  For example, 
concerns pertaining to traffic and parking are not warranted because most residents of group 
homes do not own cars, and concerns regarding density and the incompatibility of group homes 
with their surroundings are not warranted because group homes are almost always located in 
buildings originally constructed as detached homes.
130
 Based on these findings, municipal 
planning staff concluded that separation distances between group homes could not be supported 
as good planning.  
In a study of zoning bylaws and NIMBYism, Ian Skelton found that, “NIMBY, while 
predominantly grounded in unjustified social fears, has been a major driver of the application of 
municipal powers in land-use regulation.”131 Despite the requirement that municipal zoning be 
based on legitimate planning considerations and regulate land-use rather than users of the land,
132
 
Toronto’s city councillors frequently cite the negative reactions of community members to 
proposals of new land-use laws.
133
 The impact of NIMBYism on city council is evident in local 
news stories on rooming houses in Toronto. For example, some councillors have attributed the 
fact that city council has avoided discussions to extend the regulation of rooming houses across 
Toronto to protecting the “Leave it to Beaver version of the suburbs,”134 while other councillors 
in the inner suburbs have openly defended the prohibition against rooming houses in their wards 
on the basis that rooming houses will “absolutely disrupt our neighborhoods.”135 City councillor 
and chair of the Planning and Growth Management Committee, Peter Milczyn, recently 
explained that suburban councillors want to continue the rooming house ban in their 
neighbourhoods because rooming houses are a tough sell politically.
 136
 Constituents simply do 
not like them. In Scarborough, local media reported that the hostility of the community and 
ratepayer groups to allowing legal rooming houses in their neighbourhoods “should give pause to 
anyone hoping a city review will harmonize Toronto’s different rooming house bylaws at the end 
of 2015.”137 Strong local resistance delays the enactment of bylaws that increase affordable 
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housing options and the elimination of exclusionary bylaws.
138
 The case study of rooming houses 
in Toronto is demonstrative of this, as city council has continued to defer action on this matter 
due to the politicized and contentious nature of the rooming house question. More concerning, 
however, is the fact that residents influence land-use bylaws and the way in which city 
councillor’s ultimately vote on these issues at city hall. Discriminatory attitudes of the dominant 
group can not only delay human rights but can also perpetuate the violation of human rights. 
In a socio-legal study on municipal decision-making and shelters in Toronto, Prashan 
Ranasinghe and Mariana Valverde explain that although public input is theoretically open to all 
concerned parties, those who have legal occupancy in relation to a particular property (such as 
tenants or homeowners) have greater influence in land-use planning because of their social and 
political power as occupants, taxpayers, and constituents.
139
 In comparison, those advocating for 
the eradication of restrictive land-use bylaws have  relatively little social and political influence 
because they do not have legal occupancy.
140
 Ironically, those seeking a roof over their heads are 
“without the requisite means (in this case, property) to launch an attack based on the right to 
shelter; in other words, one has no claim, in municipal politics at least, to a roof over one’s head 
if one does not have a (permanent) place to call home.”141 Furthermore, the “propertied” have the 
additional advantage of supporting the position to maintain the status quo rather than challenging 
it and advocating to expand affordable housing options.
142
   
The exclusion and disadvantage that has become the status quo tends to result in the 
entrenchment of exclusion and disadvantage. Colleen Sheppard writes that, “while democratic 
participation within social institutions may intuitively seem to promote greater inclusion and 
equality… [p]roblems of exclusion from participation in democratic governance undermine its 
process as a pathway to greater equality.”143 Of course, the fact that the propertied have their 
ideas heard is not in and of itself problematic.
144
 What is problematic is that public consultation 
presupposes that all parties have equal status to voice their opinions, and this is not always the 
case.
 145
While the Code is meant to protect minority rights by imposing a duty on local 
governments to be attentive to inequality and to ensure that bylaws are not discriminatory, 
systemic inequities such as legal occupancy result in a failure to investigate the possibilities of 
accommodating Code-protected groups.
146
 The policies and practices that result from seemingly 
democratic processes can reinforce the norms and privileges of the dominant group despite the 
existence of the Code. As a result, public input in local decision-making processes can have the 
effect of reinforcing exclusion. Therefore, the reason for the persistence of discrimination is not 
only due to the mere existence of bylaws that adversely affect disadvantaged people, but also due 
to the social dynamics of discrimination and its manifestation in decision-making processes 
within municipalities. 
Unfortunately, views expressed by participants in the course of public consultations that 
are conducted as part of the policy-making process are beyond the purview of human rights 
legislation. The Code cannot do much to address discriminatory attitudes. This also means that 
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although NIMBYism plays a significant role in determining politicized issues like rooming 
houses, it is difficult to prove that the votes city councillors ultimately cast are the result of 
discriminatory attitudes that they or their constituents hold. This is particularly the case because 
municipal policy-making processes are complex and multifaceted. For example, along with 
public input, councillors consider the recommendations of experts and city staff who provide 
advice that has not been vetted by political actors as well as the recommendations of specific 
committees prior to casting their votes on zoning bylaws. The elusive nature of discrimination 
and the complexity of municipal decision-making processes make it difficult to address issues 
like housing, hold local government to account, and identify discrimination that persists at a 
systemic level. 
That being said, human rights litigation may be able to address certain elements of 
municipal policy-making procedures to mediate the impact of NIMBYism in the development of 
zoning bylaws. The Human Rights Code prohibits discrimination in the provision of “services”, 
is defined in Braithwaite v. Ontario (Attorney General) as “something which is of the benefit 
that is provided by one person to another or to the public.”147 Since human rights legislation must 
be read in a broad, liberal and purposive manner, there has been a trend towards expanding the 
governmental activity that constitutes a government service.
 148
  Therefore, it is likely that public 
meetings and consultations are a “service” under the Code and therefore city staff and 
councillors are presumably obligated to conduct them in such a way that eliminates physical 
barriers to participation as well as disadvantage caused by systemic and attitudinal that results in 
the exclusion of individuals or groups protected by the Code.
149
   
Jordana Ross has provided two excellent recommendations that would improve the 
consultation process to conform to the Code. First, she recommends that municipal planning staff 
host separate meetings with marginalized groups where public meetings are likely to be hostile 
or exclusionary.
150
 This was done in the 2015 Rooming House Review during which seven 
tenant focus groups, consultations with interest groups and an anonymous online survey were 
conducted along with the 14 community consultations.
151
 Second, Ross suggests that planners 
attend mandatory trainings on human rights and develop standards to ensure that public meetings 
are facilitated in such a way that respect the rights of Code-protected groups.
152
 Similarly, the 
Ontario Human Rights Commission has suggested that municipalities lay ground rules at the 
beginning of public meetings that emphasize that discriminatory language will not be tolerated 
and that city staff be prepared to interrupt residents when such discussions arise.
153
 It is not clear 
whether any effort has been made in this respect or whether planners are aware of their duty to 
accommodate under the Code. More must be done to ensure that city staff members are 
comfortable with managing discriminatory behaviour during public meetings and that they 
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structure the policy-making process to allow for resident input while also upholding the right of 
individuals to be free from discrimination. 
When discriminatory attitudes and views of Code-protected groups pervade the decision-
making process, the processes themselves–no matter how inclusionary–can reinforce the 
exclusion of marginalized people. Institutional practices of policy development can contribute to 
discriminatory outcomes. Human rights law is meant to ensure that duty bearers, such as city 
councils, proactively consider and uphold equality rights when developing bylaws. However, to 
uphold these rights, city councils must recognize their responsibility as duty bearers towards 
individuals who are protected under the Code not only in developing bylaws that are not 
discriminatory, but also in developing processes that eliminate barriers rather than reinforce 
those that are built into pre-existing systems. If they do not, the participatory decision-making 
process itself can become a mechanism of discrimination that entrenches inequality. 
Unfortunately for the equality project, the process of policy development and the discriminatory 
attitudes that permeate these processes cannot be directly challenged. As a result, systemic 
discrimination can, and often does, remain beyond the reach of human rights law. 
 
IV. MECHANISMS TO CHALLENGE SYSTEMIC 
DISCRIMINATION  
 
Litigation is an important tool in challenging discriminatory practices, particularly in order to 
secure specific remedies for individuals, but “litigation is not the whole system. It is not the only 
available tool for building a sustainable human rights culture.”154 Due to the inherent limitations 
of human rights legislation and the complexity of discrimination, it is important to recognize the 
utility of other mechanisms in Ontario’s human rights regime to effectively combat systemic 
discrimination. Indeed, some of these tools may be better suited to promote and foster equality 
than employing human rights law through litigation.  
The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) plays a central role in identifying 
discrimination, promoting the elimination of discriminatory practices and effecting systemic 
change. The OHRC engages in proactive measures to prevent discrimination through its public 
education, policy development and research functions.
155
 For example, pursuant to section 29(c) 
of the Code, the OHRC has the power “to undertake, direct and encourage research into 
discriminatory practices and to make recommendations designed to prevent and eliminate such 
discriminatory practices.”156 Instead of dealing with individual complaints, the OHRC addresses 
systemic human rights issues faced by vulnerable groups. The OHRC, therefore, can play an 
important role in ensuring that municipalities understand their responsibility towards 
marginalized citizens and develop bylaws that comply with the Code.  
In 2012, for example, the OHRC developed a guide, In the zone: Housing, human rights 
and municipal planning, which outlines the human rights responsibilities of municipalities in 
developing bylaws that regulate forms of housing. It suggests best practices to overcome 
discriminatory opposition and policy recommendations on developing bylaws that uphold the 
right to discrimination-free housing–individually and systemically. The Commission also 
published Room for everyone: Human rights and rental housing licencing, which sets out 
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thirteen points for municipalities to consider when embarking on rental housing licencing and 
zoning.
157
 One best practice cited by the Commission, for example, is a recommendation to set 
ground rules prior to public meetings that prohibit discriminatory or negative comments about 
the people who will live in the proposed housing and a recommendation to city councillors not to 
hold frivolous public consultations on issues like rooming houses to ensure that procedural 
inequality and discriminatory discussions do not translate into discriminatory bylaws.
158
 Finally, 
the Commission has provided input on zoning bylaws in Ontario’s municipalities. In March 2013, 
for example, the Commission submitted a report to the City of Toronto in which it voiced 
concern that some central human rights issues were not being addressed by the city in its bylaws 
and specified that the zoning bylaw falls short of the Code because it retains the requirement for 
separation distances between group homes (which has since been repealed) and does not allow 
rooming houses as of right in most parts of Toronto.
159
 The OHRC plays an important role in 
pressuring and educating municipalities to ensure that they comply with their obligations under 
the Code. 
While the OHRC’s policy and research work does promote a culture of human rights in 
Ontario, the OHRC also has the power to address systemic discrimination through litigation by 
initiating its own applications and by intervening in applications with the applicant’s consent.160 
Section 35 of the Code grants the OHRC the authority to determine what issues should be 
litigated in the public interest and make applications to the HRTO in the public interest either to 
allege discrimination or ask for a Tribunal order.
161
 Theoretically, this allows the OHRC to bring 
cases as an extension of its research on issues of systemic discrimination. However, the 
Commission has initiated few applications at the Tribunal and seems hesitant to use this tool, 
employing it only when other efforts to resolve human rights disputes have failed.
162
 Although 
the Commission has made significant progress on many of its initiatives without resorting to 
litigation and has successfully employed non-litigious strategies to effect change—as the 
Commission stated in a submission to the City of Toronto regarding its zoning bylaws—“human 
rights delayed are human rights denied.” 163  Such applications, although expensive and 
unpredictable, could have a significant impact in reducing or eliminating systemic discrimination 
and fostering systemic equality. The case study of rooming houses demonstrates the importance 
of the Andrew Pinto’s recommendation that the Commission should develop a litigation strategy 
focusing on cases in which rights are systematically deprived and applicants would otherwise 
have difficulty advancing or proving their case.
164
   
Another important development that supports combating systemic discrimination, 
identified by Fay Faraday, is the “proliferation of tribunals which now have jurisdiction to 
address substantive human rights concerns.”165 In 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 
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Tranchemontagne that due to the primacy of the Code, a myriad of administrative tribunals in 
addition to the HTRO must interpret and apply the Code, should a human rights issue arise in 
cases before them.
166
 Faraday explains that in Tranchemontagne, the court recognized the 
systemic nature of discrimination and that “human rights issues can arise in a multiplicity of 
contexts.”167 For example, the OMB, which hears applications and appeals regarding municipal 
planning, including zoning bylaws, has the power to decide human rights issues arising in that 
specific context. As a result, the OMB considered the Code in reviewing Kitchener’s bylaws 
regulating rooming houses and recognized the importance of considering human rights issues 
when developing bylaws. Tranchemontagne allows for the implementation of systemic remedies 
that contribute to combating discrimination in Ontario, and signals to municipalities the vital 
importance of considering human rights issues when making municipal planning decisions.  
Finally, it is clear from the initiatives undertaken to combat discriminatory bylaws 
regulating group homes and rooming houses in Ontario that civil society plays an essential role 
in challenging the status quo. By using human rights law as a normative tool, civil society 
organizations employ the values of equality, inclusion, dignity and belonging in order to 
advocate for systemic change. In Action Travail, Dickson CJ wrote that, “to combat 
discrimination, it is essential to create a climate in which both negative practices and negative 
attitudes can be challenged and discouraged… [to] look past these patterns of discrimination and 
to destroy those patterns.”168 Although human rights law has limitations, the values and language 
of human rights are invaluable in creating a climate in which we can collectively work towards 
the elimination of all forms of discrimination, including systemic discrimination. Human rights 
law provides a lens through which to identify, challenge and discourage dynamics of exclusion. 
Importantly, by setting out norms, values and a language of human rights, the Code plays an 
invaluable role in assisting civil society to contest policies and practices that entrench 
discrimination outside the courtroom, without resorting to litigation. As a normative tool, it also 
contributes to disrupting decision-making processes that perpetuate discrimination and 
confronting discriminatory attitudes that reinforce exclusion in our communities. There is no 
doubt that human rights law will continue to be employed by advocates and activists to challenge 
exclusionary bylaws, such as those regulating rooming houses, far into the future.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Housing is a basic need, but for many people affordable housing is difficult to find. Where these 
difficulties are the result of characteristics protected under the Code, they are illegal. It is the role 
of local governments to ensure that housing is accessible and to eliminate arbitrary or 
discriminatory barriers to access. In this paper, I have demonstrated how human rights law, 
namely the Ontario Human Rights Code, can be employed to challenge discrimination in zoning 
bylaws, as well as the limits of human rights law in this domain. The relative success of 
challenges to group home and rooming house bylaws illustrates the constraints and possibilities 
of litigation under the Code, and the need for complement tactics beyond litigation. The larger 
challenge, in addition to eliminating discriminatory bylaws, is to confront systemic 
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discrimination in municipal decision-making and societal views. In this task, Code litigation is a 
valuable tool, but only part of the solution.    
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